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This paper examines the welfare e®ects of a trade tax reduction
and an environmental tax increase that ¯x the domestic emission. The
proposed reform is shown to improve welfare of a small country. In the
large-country case, it improves domestic welfare if the initial trade tax
is higher than the optimal level while the trading country gains from
it due to its terms of trade improvement. These results suggest that
trade liberalization and environmental protection under environmental
agreements are compatible with each other.
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1 Introduction
As the world trade °ows grow, a variety of challenging issues have newly
arisen. The trade-induced expansion of environmental degradation, e.g.
global climate changes and depletion of the ozone layer led by greenhouse
gas emissions, is one of such problems to be resolved. For instance, WTO
(2009, pp. 2-24) provides a number of graphs that illustrate a positive cor-
relation between trade growth and a progress of climate changes. In order
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to cope with the environmental problem at the global level, multilateral en-
vironmental agreements (MEAs) as well as the discussions under the World
Trade Organization (WTO) have been made. The Montreal Protocol and
Kyoto Protocol are two of the most well-known examples of the MEAs, the
former of which `focused on phasing-out the consumption and production
of nearly 100 ODS (ozone-depleting substances) chemicals,' (WTO, 2009,
p. xv) and the latter of which `requires Annex I countries to collectively
reduce their emissions of the six main greenhouse gases (i.e. carbon diox-
ide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydro° uorocarbons, per°uorocarbons, and
sulphur hexa°uoride) to at least 5 per cent less than 1990 emission levels.'
(WTO, 2009, p. 71) Furthermore, the Post-Kyoto Protocol is now being
discussed in response to the ¯rst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
was expired in 2012. Then, one natural question arises: can these MEAs
help improve the wellbeing of each nation as well as the world?
This paper examines the welfare e®ects of the requirement declared
above in a criterion of a strict Pareto improvement. In other words, we
ask whether all the countries gain from a coordinated reform of trade lib-
eralization and environmental policies that follows the MEAs without an
international income transfer.1) Speci¯cally, constructing a competitive
general equilibrium model comprising two large countries and transbound-
ary pollution, we examine a unilateral reform of a trade tax reduction and
an environmental tax increase that leaves domestic emission unchanged.
Covering both the small country and large country cases, we demonstrate
that trade liberalization can be bene¯cial without hurting the environment
whether or not the country has market power in the world market. Then,
we relate our results to the ongoing discussions on `trade and the environ-
ment' under the WTO and MEAs. In this sense, this paper would serve
1) In contrast, a policy is de¯ned to be potentially Pareto-improving when it raises
welfare of the all the countries with a proper compensatory transfer.
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to o®er an economic rationale for environmental agreements, which is the
main aim of Copeland and Taylor (2005).2)
There has been a large literature that shares a motivation similar to ours.
Assuming a polluted small open economy, Copeland (1994) and Turunen-
Red and Woodland (2002) propose several reforms of trade and environ-
mental policies that improve welfare. Extending the model and argument
of these papers to a large-country context, Turunen-Red and Woodland
(2004) propose Pareto-improving reform strategies with and without inter-
national income transfers.3) Furthermore, Keen and Kotsogiannis (2012)
apply the same framework to ¯nd the conditions for a global Pareto e±-
ciency, and Vlassis (2013) demonstrates that pollution tax harmonization
is potentially Pareto-improving. Finally, this paper is also related to Hatzi-
panayotou et al. (2008, 2013), Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2013), and
Tsakiris et al. (2013) that commonly apply a competitive general equilib-
rium model to investigate welfare implications of tax reforms in the pres-
ence of pollution.4) While this paper is also along this strand of literature,
our motivation is di®erent from it in the sense that we consider a unilateral
policy reform, which seems more feasible than multilateral reforms because
reforms involving many countries are often di±cult to settle.
2) One of the striking results in Copeland and Taylor (2005, p. 229) is that `the
increase in emissions in the unconstrained region (non-participants) may be small
or even non-existent' even though the participating countries reduce their emission
according to the Protocol.
3) While Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004) assume pollutions negatively a®ect con-
sumer utility as is usually supposed in the literature, Kotsogiannis and Woodland
(2013) extend the results to the case in which pollutions a®ect the production
possibility set. See also Copeland (2011) and Chen and Woodland (2012) for a
comprehensive survey.
4) The models employed in these papers di®er in that Hatzipanayotou et al. (2013)
and Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2008) assume a (single) small open country,
Hatzipanaoytou et al. (2008) assume two small countries, and Tsakiris et al. (2013)
assume two large countries.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Section
3 considers the welfare e®ects of the above-proposed reform in the cases
of a small open country and two large countries, respectively. Section 4
concludes.
2 Model
This section develops a two-country perfectly competitive model in which
the world commodity price is endogenously determined and an emission in
a country arrives in the trading country. The small open country case
will arise as a special case of the two-country model.5) Suppose two coun-
tries (Home and Foreign) each of which produces and consumes two goods
(Goods 1 and 2). Home is assumed to export Good 1, and levy an export
tax t and an emission tax s both of which take a speci¯c (per-unit) form
whereas Foreign observes a laissez-faire policy.6)
Letting p denote the world price of Good 1 measured by Good 2, the
behavior of Home's consumer is described by an expenditure function:
e(p¡ t; u; z) ´ min
x1;x2
f(p¡ t)x1 + x2jU(x1; x2; z) ¸ ug ;
where u is utility, z is a pollution in Home, xi; i = 1; 2 is consumption of
Goods 1 and 2, and U(¢) is a utility function.7) Similarly, the production
side is described by a revenue function:
r(p¡ t¡ s) ´ max
y1;y2
f(p¡ t¡ s)y1 + y2j(y1; y2) 2 Y g ;
5) Our model is a simpli¯ed version of the model of Turunen-Red and Woodland
(2004), Keen and Kotsougiannis (2012), and Kotsougiannis and Woodland (2013).
6) The import tari® case corresponds to t < 0. It is fair to say that our assumption
that Foreign is passive is plausible by regarding Home as an Annex I (constrained)
country of the Kyoto Protocol and Foreign as a non-participant (unconstrained)
country.
7) Note that the consumer price is given by p¡ t since the Home government imposes
an export tax on Good 1.
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where yi; i = 1; 2 is output of Goods 1 and 2, and Y is a production possi-
bility set. One can de¯ne the expenditure and revenue functions of Foreign,
and an asterisk is attached to all the Foreign variables and functions. As-
suming that production of Good 1 proportionally emits a pollutant, and
that µ 2 [0; 1] fraction of a country's emission reaches the other country,
the pollution of Home and Foreign is given by
Home : z = rp(p¡ t¡ s) + µr¤p(p)
Foreign : z¤ = µrp(p¡ t¡ s) + r¤p(p);
where subscript p refers to a derivative with respect to the price. When
µ = 0 (res. µ = 1), pollution is local (resp. global).
Summarizing these assumptions, the model consists of three equations:
e
 
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Eq. (??) is an income-expenditure equality of Home, where t[rp(¢)¡ ep(¢)]
is an export tax revenue, and srp(¢) is an emission tax revenue. Eq. (2) is
a counterpart of Foreign, and (3) is a world market-clearing condition of
Good 1. This system determines three endogenous variables u; u¤ and p
given the two taxes t and s.
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where subscript z represents a partial derivative with respect to the pol-
lution. Eq. (4) o®ers a basis for the comparative statics analysis made in
the subsequent section.
3 Emission-neutral reform
This section examines the welfare e®ects of a reduction in t and an
associated change in s so that the Home emission rp is constant. This re-
quirement has been increasingly important in recent debates over climate
change policies, and embedded in the Kyoto Protocol that `requires in-
dustrialized countries to meet agreed levels of emission reductions over an
initial commitment period that runs from 2008 to 2012.' (WTO, 2009, p.
68) In view of the fact that the Protocol is signed by both developing and
developed countries, we begin with the case of a small open economy, and
then proceed to the large country case.
3.1 Small open economy
Suppose that Home is a small open country.8) Then, the equilibrium
is given by Eq. (??) alone in which u is the only endogenous variable.
In addition, the requirement that rp is constant is achieved by adjusting
two taxes according to ds = ¡dt since this reform ¯xes the producer price
p¡ t¡s.9) Making use of (4), the proposed emission-neutral reform a®ects
the Home welfare as follows.
dujd(p¡t¡s)=0 =
tepp
eu + tepu
dt: (5)
8) This subsection contains nothing new since the results to follow are substantially
the same as Proposition 2 in Michael and Hatzipanayotou (2013). Therefore, if
the referees think that this subsection is redundant, we will omit it without any
hesitation.
9) This reform is called a `producer-price-neutral' reform by Michael and Hatzipanay-
otou (2008) and Hatzipanayotou et al. (2012).
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Following the existing literature, let assume a Hatta Normality Condition
that eu + tepu > 0.
10) Then, we can establish:
Proposition 1. In the small-country case, the welfare e®ect of the emission-
neutral export reduction and the associated change in emission tax on Home
is positive.
Proof. From the Hatta Normality Condition eu+ tepu > 0 and epp < 0, we
have
signfdug = ¡signft ¢ dtg:
When the trade tax takes the form of an export tax, t is positive and its
reduction is given by dt < 0, from which du > 0 follows. jj
The intuition for Proposition 1 is simple. In the present case of a small
open country, the production-generated externality is the only market dis-
tortion, and hence the ¯rst-best outcome involves free trade (zero trade
tax) and a positive emission (production) tax that is equal to the marginal
damage from pollution. Since the requirement that ds = ¡dt allows the
country to approach the ¯rst-best solution above, the welfare e®ect turns
out to be positive. In this sense, Proposition 1 o®ers a useful policy pre-
scription that is (weakly) win-win, namely, welfare improves without hurt-
ing the environment.
10) See Hatta (1977a, b). By linear homogeneity of the expenditure function, we have
an identity e(p ¡ t; u; z) ´ (p ¡ t)ep(p ¡ t; u; z) + e0(p ¡ t; u; z), where e0(¢) is
(compensated) demand of the numeraire. Di®erentiating both sides with respect
to u leads to eu = (p ¡ t)epu + e0u, which is equivalent to eu + tepu = pepu + e0u.
That is, the inequality eu + tepu > 0 requires the total expenditure evaluated at
the world prices to rise as a result of an increase in u. This is why Falvey and
Kreickemeier (2011, p. 284) state that `this is clearly a weak condition, and hence
the assumption ¢ ¢ ¢ is made throughout the literature on piecemeal trade reform.'
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3.2 Large open economies
This subsection turns to the large-country case in which the world price
p is endogenous. Then, the strategy ds = ¡dt no longer makes constant
either of the producer price p ¡ t ¡ s and the Home emission level rp.
Thus, we must ¯rst de¯ne the coordinated reduction in t and a change in
s so that the producer price is kept constant. Taking into account that
p is endogenous, the emission-neutral (producer-price-neutral) reform is
formalized by
d(p¡ t¡ s) =

@p
@t
¡ 1

dt+

@p
@s
¡ 1

ds = 0:
Utilizing the di®erentiated system of (4), the two taxes have to change
according to
ds = ¡ @p=@t¡ 1
@p=@s¡ 1dt = ¡
A
B
dt (6)
A ´ tepu

e¤u
 
e¤pp ¡ r¤pp
¡ e¤pu  e¤p ¡ r¤p+ eue¤u  e¤pp ¡ r¤pp
¡epue¤u(ep ¡ rp)¡ eue¤pu
 
e¤p ¡ r¤p

B ´ tepu

e¤u
 
e¤pp ¡ r¤pp
¡ e¤pu  e¤p ¡ r¤p+ eue¤u  epp + e¤pp ¡ r¤pp
¡epue¤u(ep ¡ rp)¡ eue¤pu
 
e¤p ¡ r¤p

;
where use is made of euepz ¡ ezepu = 0, which follows by di®erentiating
the well-known identity ep(p; u; z) ´ x(p; e(p; u; z)) with respect to u and
z: epu = xeeu and epz = xeez. Here, x(¢) denotes an ordinary demand
function of Good 1.
While the sign of A and B can be both positive and negative, we make
an assumption that will play a key role in the subsequent arguments:
Assumption 1: B < 0.
One may claim that this assumption is extremely strong, but it can be
justi¯ed as follows. When we manipulate drp(p¡ t¡ s)=ds, we have
| 70 |
Fujiwara?Welfare Implications of an Emission-Neutral Trade and Environmental Tax Reform
drp(p¡ t¡ s)
ds
= ¡ rppB
determinant of the coe±cient matrix of (4)
:
That is, B measures the e®ect of the production tax on domestic pro-
duction. Hence, the assumption of B < 0, coupled with the Walrasian
stability, ensures a normal comparative statics outcome drp=ds < 0 so that
a rise in the production tax decreases domestic production.11) Once this
is noticed, Assumption 1 seems less stringent than is thought.
Substituting (6) into ds in the right-hand side (RHS) of (4), it becomes
RHS of (4) =
epp
B
26664
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E
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:
To identify the e®ect of the proposed reform on u; u¤ and p, let us make
a comparative statics by replacing the right-hand side of (4) with (7).
Lengthy manipulations lead to
dujd(p¡t¡s)=0 =
epp

e¤u
 
e¤pp¡r¤pp
¡e¤pu  e¤p¡r¤pt¡ e¤u(ep¡rp+µezr¤pp)e¤u(e¤pp¡r¤pp)¡e¤pu(e¤p¡r¤p)

B
dt
(8)
du¤jd(p¡t¡s)=0 = ¡
euepp
 
e¤p ¡ r¤p + e¤zr¤pp

B
dt (9)
dpjd(p¡t¡s)=0 =
eue
¤
uepp
B
dt: (10)
Given the negativity of B, (9) and (10) allow us to ¯nd that the coordinated
tax reform improves Foreign's terms of trade (a fall in p), and hence raises
11) The Walrasian stability requires that the determinant of the coe±cient matrix be
negative.
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Foreign's welfare. What is important is that the welfare e®ect on Home
solely depends on the export tax regardless of the value of the emission
tax. In order to prove the main result, we add another assumption the
justi¯cation of which will be given later.
Assumption 2. e¤u
 
e¤pp ¡ r¤pp
¡ e¤pu  e¤p ¡ r¤p < 0.
Then, we can establish:
Proposition 2. In the large-country case with Assumptions 1 and 2, the
welfare e®ect on Home is positive if the export tax is higher than the optimal
level whereas the welfare e®ect on Foreign is positive.
Proof. It su±ces to prove the former part of the proposition since the latter
part has already been demonstrated. Making use of (4), and solving the
system of equations @u=@t = @u=@s = 0 for t, the optimal export tax topt
is obtained as
topt =
e¤u
 
ep ¡ rp + µezr¤pp

e¤u
 
e¤pp ¡ r¤pp
¡ e¤pu  e¤p ¡ r¤p : (11)
Since the Home government undoubtedly has an incentive to levy a positive
export tax to improve its terms of trade, we should have Assumption 2
to ensure topt > 0. Relating (11) to (8), the welfare e®ect on Home is
algebraically given by
signfdug = ¡sign f(t¡ topt) dtg :
Hence, Home gains from the suggested reform if the Home export is initially
over-taxed as compared to the optimal level since t¡ topt > 0 and dt < 0.
jj
While the large-country case complicates the model and analysis, the
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argument that is parallel with Proposition 1 can be made. The e®ect on
the Foreign welfare is obvious since reduced export taxes of Home increases
its export, and hence lowers the world price of Good 1. This serves as a
terms of trade gain for Foreign, thereby improving its welfare. In addition,
a fall in the world price results in a contraction of Foreign production
of Good 1. Recalling that the Home emission remains unchanged, the
pollution in Foreign decreases, which additionally has a positive e®ect on
the Foreign welfare.
The e®ect on the Home welfare is interpreted as follows. When Home has
market power in the world market, the Home government is motivated to
impose a positive export tax so as to enjoy the terms of trade gain. Hence,
Home is subject to the terms of trade externality as well as a negative
externality from pollution. If the export tax and the emission tax are
adjusted so that (6) is satis¯ed, the e®ect from the latter externality is
neutralized. Consequently, whether Home gains from the proposed reform
is determined by resorting to the theory of optimal trade taxes. That is, if
the Home export is higher than the optimal level, reducing it is bene¯cial,
and vice versa in the case of under-taxes.
Remark. Thus far, we have con¯ned attention to the export tax case.
However, it is worth addressing the import tari® case since import tari®s
prevail much more widely than export taxes. Note ¯rst that if the trade tax
is an import tari®, t is negative, and its reduction is given by dt > 0. Then,
it immediately follows from signfdug = ¡signft ¢ dtg that the emission-
neutral tari®-tax reform bene¯ts Home.
In contrast, the large-country case is not so straightforward. As to the
welfare e®ect on Home, we can continue to claim that it is positive if
the import tari® exceeds the optimal level by using the equation in the
proof of Proposition 2: signfdug = ¡sign f(t¡ topt) dtg. This is because
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reductions in tari®s that are higher than the optimal level imply t¡ topt <
0 and dt > 0. But, the welfare e®ect on Foreign becomes ambiguous
since the coe±cient of the right-hand side in (9) can be both positive and
negative. All we can say is that the proposed reform bene¯ts Foreign when
e¤p ¡ r¤p + e¤zr¤pp < 0. This is because the suggested reform raises the world
price and Foreign emission, which, in turn, yields a gain from the terms
of trade improvement and a loss from the expended pollution. That is,
our reform succeeds in a strict Pareto improvement if the environmental
concern in Foreign is small enough to have the above su±cient condition.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has combined a theory of piecemeal policy reforms with an
economic assessment of environmental agreements such as the Montreal
Protocol, Kyoto Protocol and Post-Kyoto Protocol. We have shown that
a small open country gains from a coordinated reform of an export tax
reduction and an emission tax increase that ¯xes the domestic emission.
Then, we have proceeded to the two-large-country model, demonstrating
that the same reform is strictly Pareto-improving if the initial trade tax is
higher than the optimal level. These results may hopefully contribute to
literature that makes an economic assessment of the environmental agree-
ments.
Despite the above novelty, we admittedly recognize that a number of
questions are open. First, we have chosen a canonical model of perfect com-
petition. But, we have already known that qualitatively the same results
survive a model of a monopoly and oligopoly.12) Second, we have focused
on a unilateral reform such that Foreign observes laissez-faire. While this
assumption seems to well-approximate the reality in which several major
12) The non-competitive case is considered in a companion paper.
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countries, e.g., the United States, leave the Kyoto Protocol. However, it is
of great importance to pursue a welfare consequence of a multilateral re-
form. These agenda are left as a future direction of research that is worth
trying.
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